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Abstract
Cloud Computing is a promising service platform to access computing resources on demand over the Internet. It moves the data and
applications to the large data centres where data and services can be managed in a much better manner than locally. However, its use
puts forth a lot of challenging issues related to security, privacy and reliability of the overall system. In this paper, we focus on the
problem of data-integrity veriﬁcation(by a third party auditor) for the client’s data residing on a cloud storage server(CSS). Here, we
optimize an existing third party auditing protocol and make it resistant to replace, replay and forge attacks launched by malicious
insiders at cloud storage server. We also propose a protocol to perform eﬃcient block-level and ﬁne-grained dynamic-data update
operations on data stored on cloud using a modiﬁed Chameleon Authentication Tree. Extensive security and performance analysis
shows that our protocols are eﬃcient and can resist aforementioned attacks.
c© 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V.
Peer-review under responsibility of the Organizing Committee of ICACC 2016.
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1. Introduction
Cloud Computing is an Internet-based model and is one of the most important development of current era in
computing technology and considered as next-generation architecture of IT-enterprise[1] because of its long list of
advantages such as on-demand self-service, broad network access, rapid elasticity, location-independent resource
pooling, and measured usage service. Switching to this pay-as-you-go model and using the computing resources and
services in the form of Saas, PaaS and IaaS from a distant data-centre of a Cloud Service Provider(CSP) is found to be
much cheaper than having own IT-infrastructure. By moving their data on cloud, it becomes convenient for users to
access and use the resources without taking care of complex hardware management. This responsibility is delegated
to the cloud service provider.
However, use of cloud computing puts forth many challenging issues related to security, privacy and reliability of
this overall system. One of the major concern is data security. After outsourcing their data on cloud storage, users
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Fig. 1. Architecture of Cloud Storage
do not keep any local copy of it. This gives the malicious insiders at CSP a chance to behave unfaithfully towards
the cloud users regarding the status of their data. For example, the malicious CSP may discard the rarely accessed
data without being detected or it may hide the data-loss incidents from clients so as to maintain a reputation. Thus,
integrity veriﬁcation of client’s data(outsourced on cloud) becomes one of the prime necessity.
In this paper, we investigate the problem of data-integrity veriﬁcation of client’s data stored on cloud by a third
party auditor(TPA), also known as Third Party Auditing of data. To address this and other related problems, extensive
research has been carried out [4][5][6][7][8][12][13]. In the recent existing model [4][12], the TPA challenges the
Cloud Storage Server (CSS) who answers the challenge request with a probabilistic proof of data integrity. Here,
we optimized the data auditing by proposing some modiﬁcations in the existing protocol[4]. Additionally, we also
propose an eﬃcient construction for dynamic update of client/user’s data (on cloud) by modifying the Chameleon
Authentication Tree [17][18]. Our research contributions are summarized as follows:
1. We propose an optimized public auditing protocol. In this protocol, we optimize the CSS-response size by
storing Homomorphic Linear Authenticators(HLA) for user’s data on TPA’s site. We also optimize TPA’s challenge
requests to CSS using a Quasi-random function.
2. We use Chameleon Hashing and a modiﬁed Chameleon Authentication Tree to perform eﬃcient dynamic data
updates on client’s data (on cloud) with support for both block-level updates and ﬁne-grained updates.
3. By thorough security and performance analysis, we prove that our approach is secure and eﬃcient.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section-2 deﬁnes our system model, security model and design goals.
Section-3 provides basic notations and preliminaries used in this work. Section-4 provides a detailed description of
our proposed model. Section-5 provides security analysis. Section-6 provides performance analysis of our protocols.
Section-7 discusses related work. Finally, we give conclusion in section 8.
2. Problem statement
2.1. System Model
A network architecture used for cloud data storage is shown in Figure 1. It has three diﬀerent network entities that
can be identiﬁed as follows:
• Client/Cloud-User: an entity that can be either individual consumers or organizations, has large amount of data
ﬁles to be stored in the cloud and relies on the cloud for data maintenance and computation.
• Cloud Storage Server(CSS): an entity that has signiﬁcant storage space, computation power and resources to
maintain the client’s data. It is managed by a Cloud Service Provider(CSP). Hereafter, we will not diﬀerentiate
between CSS and CSP.
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• Third Party Auditor(TPA): an entity that has capabilities and expertise to access and expose the risk associated
with cloud storage services. It is trusted to perform this task on behalf of clients upon request.
In this paper, we consider that the auditing task is done by an authorized TPA who is unbiased. The CSS is
considered to be semi-trusted.
2.2. Security Threats
In this paper, we consider three types of attacks on data/meta-data. These are:
• Replace Attacks: The malicious CSS may discard a challenged data block(mi) or its meta-data(σi) and replace
them with another pair of valid and uncorrupted data-block(mj) and meta-data(σ j) in order to pass the auditing.
• Forge Attacks: The malicious CSS or auditor(TPA) may forge the block meta-data(HLAs) resulting in improper
and unsatisfactory data auditing.
• Replay Attacks: The malicious CSS generates the proof using non-updated/previous data, previous proof or
other information, without querying client’s actual data.
2.3. Design Goals
Our design goals are as follows:
• Optimized Public Auditability of cloud data storage: to allow an authorized TPA to verify the correctness of
client’s data stored on cloud without retrieving it(Blockless Veriﬁcation) and without incurring any additional
online burden for client/cloud-user.
• Support for dynamic data update operations: to allow cloud-user/client to perform block-level and ﬁne-grained
updates on its ﬁles in as eﬃcient as possible manner.
3. Notations and Preliminaries
3.1. Chameleon Authentication Tree
A Chameleon Authentication Tree [17][18] is a generalized Merkle hash tree where every right child of a node is
equal to chameleon hash of the concatenation of its children and every left child of a node is equal to simple hash of
the concatenation of its children. In Figure 2, we show a modiﬁed Chameleon Authentication Tree(we call it mCAT )
Fig. 2. Modiﬁed Chameleon Authentication Tree(mCAT )
in which the value of the leftmost node at every level of the tree is equal to the chameleon hash of concatenation of
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its children. All nodes which are superscripted by Ch are equal to the chameleon hash of the concatenation on their
respective children. The nodes which are superscripted by H are equal to the simple hash (h()) of the concatenation
of their respective children. H1 = h(m1),H2 = h(m2), ...,H16 = h(m16) where h() is a cryptographic hash function.
4. Proposed Scheme
4.1. Overview
To ensure integrity of data, we propose an optimized public auditing and dynamic data update scheme. It consists
of three phases:
1. Setup Phase: This phase includes: key generation, ﬁle pre-processing leading to block-metadata(HLAs) and
mCAT generation for the ﬁle, and authorizing a third party auditor.
2. Dynamic Data Update Phase: In this phase, the client performs block-level and ﬁne-grained updates on its data
stored on cloud using mCAT. Thereafter, it computes new HLA for modiﬁed block and stores it on TPA’s site.
3. Third Party Auditing Phase: In this phase, an authorized third party auditor(TPA) sends a challenge-request
to the CSS. The CSS returns an integrity-proof, corresponding to the set of challenged blocks, back to the TPA.
Thereafter, TPA veriﬁes the integrity of the challenged set of blocks.
Now, following is the detailed description of our scheme:
4.2. Setup Phase
Let G be a Gap-Diﬃe-Hellman group of prime order p, supported by Zp where p is a large prime, H : (0, 1)∗ → G
be a collision-resistant hash function, h() be a cryptographic hash function, ch() be a chameleon hash function [18][19]
and e : G × G → GT be a bilinear map [20]. The client ﬁrst negotiates these parameters with other parties(CSS and
TPA) and then runs the following algorithms:
KeyGen(1λ): The client generates a value α ∈ Zp and a generator g of G. α becomes part of the secret key and
(g, gα) becomes part of the public key. The client uses chGen(1λ) to generate key pair (csk, cpk) for the chameleon
hash function ch() where csk is the secret key and cpk is the public key of this chameleon hash function. Finally, the
secret key of client is: (α, csk) and public key is: (g, gα, cpk).
HLA generation: The client divides ﬁle F into n blocks of equal size. Thus, F = (m1,m2,m3, ...,mn),mi ∈ Zp. It
generates a random number u ← G. Then, for each block mi(i = 1, 2, ..., n), the client generates an Homomorphic
Linear Authenticator(HLA): σi ← (H(mi).umi)α
Thus, there will be n HLAs. The set of n HLAs is denoted by φ = {σi}, 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Then, the client creates a mCAT , T
whose leaves are hashes of ﬁle blocks (h(mi), 1 ≤ i ≤ n).
Authorize TPA: The client chooses a TPA and asks its ID. The client generates an authorization info kauth and
generates the signature sigauth = (kauth||ID)α. It sends the sigauth and an auditing delegation request to TPA.
Finally, client stores {F,T, kauth} on CSS and {φ, u} on TPA. And, deletes {F,T, kauth, φ} from its memory. It keeps
only the pre-images of the unused dummy nodes of mCAT .
4.3. Dynamic Data Update Phase
In this phase, client/cloud-user interacts with CSS to perform updates on its data. The update phase supports the
following kind of update requests: PM(Partial Modiﬁcation of block) and R(Replacement of a block by another).
Considering ﬁgure 2, the dynamic data update process for PM is as follows:
1. The client composes a request BlockRequest = {i} where i is index of the block to be modiﬁed, and sends it to
CSS.
2. CSS receives BlockRequest and performs the following operation:
CSS locates mi and computes the authentication path of mCAT for mi. Then, it generates a response, Response =
{mi, h(mad j), aPath, sigc(aPath), vh,0} where mad j is the sibling of mi, aPath is the authentication path for data block
mi, sigc(aPath) = (aPath)α is client’s signature over aPath, and vh,0 is the ﬁrst leftmost node that can be reached
while moving from h(mi) along the path towards root. Finally, it sends Response to client/cloud-user.
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3. Upon receiving the Response, client performs the operation:
Veri f yAuth: First of all, client veriﬁes signature over aPath .i.e. it checks whether
e(sigc(aPath), g) == e(aPath, gα) (1)
If this test fails, then client aborts the process. Otherwise, client computes h(mi). Then, client uses h(mi), h(mad j), aPath
to compute v′h,0 (value of ﬁrst leftmost node we can reach if we start from h(mi) and go towards root by following a
path). Finally, client checks whether: vh,0 == v′h,0
If this test fails, then client aborts the process. Otherwise, the client computes m′i (as desired from mi) and h(m
′
i) and
uses them to generate the collision value r′(using col() function) for the very ﬁrst node(vh′,i in CAT) whose value
is computed using the Chameleon Hash Function, ch() and lying on the path from the node h(m′i) to some node
vh,0 (such that height h ≥ h′). Then, client uses r′ to update the authentication path aPath to aPath′ and computes
signature over aPath′ .i.e. sigc(aPath′) = (aPath′)α. Then, client forms the update request UpdateRequest =
{PM, i, o, data, aPath′, sigc(aPath′)} and sends it to CSS. CSS updates the block mi to m′i using data, starting from
oﬀset o in mi. Also, it updates the authentication path in mCAT by using new randomnesses in aPath′ and replaces
old sigc(aPath) with sigc(aPath′). Then, it sends a ”Update Successful” response to client.
4. Upon receiving ”Update Successful” response from CSS, client computes new HLA for modiﬁed block m′i :
σ′i ← (H(m′i).um
′
i )α and sends it to TPA. TPA replaces the old HLA(σi) by this new HLA(σ′i). Thereafter, client
deletes m′i from its memory.
4.4. Third Party Auditing Phase
In this phase, the authorized TPA(holding sigauth sent by the client) interacts with the CSS to ascertain the integrity
of the client’s data. Mainly, three operations are performed:
1. Challenge-Request Generation: This operation is performed by TPA. It has {φ, u, sigauth} as shared by the client
during setup phase. TPA takes its ID and encrypts it with public key of CSS: {ID}PKCSS . Now, TPA uses a quasi-
random function(in our case, a Sobol function), fs() to generate c diﬀerent block indices. Let I ⊆ [1, n] be the set of c
block-indices generated by our quasi-random function [14], fs(). Now, TPA chooses c random-coeﬃcients denoted as
{vi ∈ Zp}i∈I . Finally, it forms a challenge request, ChallengeReq = {{ID}PKCSS , {i, vi}i∈I , sigauth} and sends it to CSS.
2. Integrity-Proof Generation: After receiving the ChallengeReq = {u, {ID}PKCSS , {i, vi}i∈I , sigauth}, CSS veriﬁes
sigauth. To do so, CSS ﬁrst decrypts ID using its private key S KCSS and concatenates it with kauth (i.e. kauth ‖ ID).
Then, it veriﬁes whether
e(sigauth, g) = e(kauth ‖ ID, gα) (2)
If signature (sigauth) veriﬁcation fails, then it rejects the ChallengeReq. Otherwise, CSS computes μ =
∑
i∈I vimi ∈ Zp
and ξ =
∏
i∈I H(mi)vi considering all ﬁle block whose index i ∈ I. Finally, it sends proof IntegrityProo f = {μ, ξ} to
TPA.
3. Integrity Veriﬁcation: After receiving the IntegrityProo f = {μ, ξ} from CSS, TPA performs the operation
Veri f yIntegrity which constitutes the following: TPA uses {i, vi}i∈I (from ChallengeReq ) and stored σi (i ∈ I) of ﬁle
blocks to compute σ =
∏
i∈I σivi ∈ G and veriﬁes whether
e(σ, g) = e(ξ.uμ, gα) (3)
If it is not so, then it implies an integrity violation of client’s data (stored on CSS) and TPA reports the client about it.
5. Security Analysis
In this section, we ﬁrst elaborate on the correctness of various phases. Then, we discuss how our scheme resists
various attacks over data stored on cloud.
5.1. Correctness:
There are two veriﬁcation processes in our scheme. First, during dynamic data update phase, the client requests
the block(mi), to be updated, from CSS and checks whether the data in this block and its authentication path(aPath)
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is correct and the previous update on this data is successfully done or not. Second, during third party auditing phase,
TPA veriﬁes the probabilistic proof of integrity generated by CSS.
The correctness of both these veriﬁcation processes can be proved by proving the following theorems:
Theorem 1. Given the CSS storing data blocks of ﬁle F and TPA storing HLAs/signatures over these ﬁle blocks, TPA
is able to correctly verify the possession of those blocks during third party auditing phase.
Proo f : Providing the correctness of our auditing scheme is equivalent to proving equation-(3) correct. The correct-
ness of equation-(3) can be elaborated as follows:
Let I = [s1, s2, ..., sc] be a set of c diﬀerent indices generated using a quasi-random function.
e(σ, g) = e(
∏sc
i=s1
σvii , g) = e(
∏sc
i=s1
((H(mi).umi )α)vi , g)
= e(
∏sc
i=s1
((H(mi).umi)vi)α, g)
= e(
∏sc
i=s1
(H(mi).umi )vi , g)α
= e(
∏sc
i=s1
H(mi)vi .umivi , g)α
= e(
∏sc
i=s1
H(mi)vi .
∏sc
j=s1
umjv j , g)α
= e(
∏sc
i=s1
H(mi)vi .u
∑sc
j=s1
mjv j , g)α
= e((
∏sc
i=s1
H(mi)vi ).uμ, g)α
= e(ξ.uμ, g)α = e(ξ.uμ, gα)
(4)
Theorem 2. Given the CSS storing data blocks of ﬁle F and the Chameleon Authentication Tree to authenticate this
ﬁle, client is able to correctly verify that whether the previous update on a block(mi) is actually happened or not.
Proo f : Providing the correctness of veriﬁcation of previous update on a block before updating the same block is
equivalent to proving equation-(1) correct. The correctness of equation-(1) can be elaborated as follows:
e(sigc(aPath), g) = e((aPath)α, g) = e(aPath, g)α.1
= e(aPath, g)1.α
= e(aPath, gα)
(5)
5.2. Resistance to attacks:
Theorem 3. Our dynamic auditing protocol can resist the Replace Attack from the server.
Proo f : We know that the veriﬁcation equation(3): e(σ, g) = e(ξ.uμ, gα) will not hold if any challenged block, residing
on CSS, is corrupted or modiﬁed without client’s consent. Now, in order to hide corruption or modiﬁcation of some
data block(mk), CSS can replace it with mj. If this kth block(which is now mj) is challenged, then CSS will form the
following response:
ξ = (H(mj))vk .
∏
i∈I−{k} H(mi)vi
μ = vkmj +
∑
i∈I−{k} vimi
(6)
and sends (ξ, μ) to TPA. TPA will try to verify equation-(3):
Let I = {s1, s2, ..., sc} be the set of indices representing the set of challenged blocks.
LHS:
e(σ, g) = e(
∏sc
i=s1
σvii , g)
= e(
∏sc
i=s1
((H(mi).umi)α)vi , g)
= e((H(mk).umk )α.vk .
∏
i∈I−{k}(H(mi).umi)α.vi , g)
= e((H(mk).umk )vk .
∏
i∈I−{k}(H(mi).umi)vi , g)α
(7)
RHS:
e(ξ.uμ, gα) = e([H(mi)vk .
∏
i∈I−{k} H(mi)vi].uvkmj+
∑
i∈I−{k} vimi , gα)
= e(H(mi)vk .uvkmj .
∏
i∈I−{k} H(mi)vi .
∏
i∈I−{k} uvimi , g)α
= e((H(mj).umj )vk .[
∏
i∈I−{k}(H(mi).umi)vi], g)α
(8)
Now, because of collision-resistance of hash function(H()), H(mk)  H(mj). Thus, (H(mj).umj)vk  (H(mk).umk )vk and
LHS  RHS. Hence, If CSS replaces a corrupted mk by a legitimate block mj, the corresponding HLA(at TPA) cannot
be replaced by CSS. Due to which, the veriﬁcation equation-(3) will not hold and proof from CSS cannot pass the
auditing. Thus, our dynamic auditing protocol can resist a replace attack by CSS.
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Fig. 3. (a) Computation time for generation of mCAT for diﬀerent ﬁle sizes and block sizes(s); (b) Computation time for authentication and
updation of Authentication path in mCAT for diﬀerent ﬁle sizes and block indices, during dynamic data update phase.
Theorem 4. Our dynamic auditing protocol can resist the Forge Attack.
Proo f : Since, all the HLA’s are stored at TPA site, CSS cannot forge any of them. Now, TPA does not know secret
key(α) of client. Secondly, it does not know mi, ∈ [1, n]. Due to collision resistance of hash function(H()) and Gap-
Diﬃe Hellman group assumption, TPA cannot forge any HLA. Thus, our dynamic auditing protocol resists the forge
attack.
Theorem 5. Our dynamic auditing protocol can resist the Replay Attack from the server.
Proo f : In dynamic data update phase, before sending an update request to CSS, client updates the HLA, for that
data, on TPA. Now, even though CSS does not update data as requested by the client, the HLA at TPA is updated.
During challenge-response cycle, if CSS generates a proof using non-updated/previous data(i.e. if it performs replay
attack) the veriﬁcation equation(3): e(σ, g) = e(ξ.uμ, gα) will not hold and replay attack will be detected. Hence, our
dynamic auditing protocol can resist the replay attack from CSS.
6. Performance Analysis
In this section, we provide a thorough computational cost evaluation of the proposed construction. We built our
own cloud as testing environment by using three 64-bit linux machines each having Intel i7 processor clocked at 3.0
GHz and 16 GB of system memory. Two of them acted as Openstack swift object storage [21] node and the third one
did the function of a controller node. A fourth system of same conﬁguration was taken as auditing server. Along with
them, a Linux machine with Intel (R) Core(TM)2 Duo CPU clocked at 2.40 GHz and 4 GB of system memory(RAM)
is used as the user. Here, we have implemented 80-bit security. The size of prime order p of the GDH group G of the
bilinear mapping is 160 bits in length. GT is of 512 bits in length. Our computational results are shown in following
graphs.
In Figure 3(a), we have shown the computation cost for generation of mCAT at the client’s side. Here, with
increase in size of ﬁle, the computation cost for generation of mCAT increases. Also, for a particular ﬁle-size(say,
5KB), increase in block size(S) results in increase in computation cost. In Figure 3(b), we have shown the overall
computation time for authentication of a ﬁle-block and thereafter modiﬁcation and update of the authentication path
for a cycle of dynamic data update for various block-indices and also for ﬁles of diﬀerent sizes. In Figure 4(a), we have
shown the overall computation time per task for challenge generation + response generation + integrity veriﬁcation
with increase in number of auditing tasks for both existing scheme and our proposed scheme. Each auditing task
involves sending a set of block indices to the CSS as part of challenge request and thereafter response generation and
veriﬁcation of integrity of these challenged blocks. Figure 4(b) shows the comparison between mCAT and a Merkle
Hash Tree (MHT) [16] in terms of number of hash computations for diﬀerent dynamic update requests on a 2 KB ﬁle
with block-size=32 bytes. In MHT, to authenticate an update operation, one hash value is computed at every level of
the tree. Thus if there are 2n blocks in the ﬁle (therefore, 2n leaf nodes in the tree), exactly log2(n) hash values will
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Fig. 4. (a) Overall Computation time per task for Third party auditing of data residing on cloud storage server with increase in number of auditing
tasks, for existing and proposed method; (b) Comparison between mCAT and MHT in terms of the number of hash computations for diﬀerent
update requests.
be computed for update on every mi, 1 ≤ i ≤ n. That is, it remains constant irrespective of where updated block mi
is residing in ﬁle F. In case of mCAT, the number of hash computations increase incrementally while authenticating
update operations. For eg.: for m1 and m2, no. of hash computations = 1; for m3 and m4, no. of hash computations =
2; for mi, 5 ≤ i ≤ 8, no. of hash computations = 4; for mi, 9 ≤ i ≤ 16, no. of hash computations = 8 and so on. Thus,
the number of hash computations are less if the updated block mi is lying towards the beginning of ﬁle F. This kind of
optimization is obtained by using an mCAT for authentication during dynamic data update operations.
7. Related Work
There is extensive research work available in literature related to integrity veriﬁcation and dynamic data updates
on client’s data stored on cloud. This available research work can be divided into two parts: Static protocols and
Dynamic protocols. Static protocols deal with the integrity veriﬁcation of archival data stored on cloud that is not
updated. Dynamic protocols deal with the integrity veriﬁcation of data(stored on cloud) that is updated by client on a
regular basis.
Proofs of retrievability(POR) by Jules et al.[7] was one of the ﬁrst static model because this scheme can only
be applied to static(archival) data storage. Secondly, its security framework was not complete. PDP (provable data
possession) by Ateniese et al. [6] was the ﬁrst scheme that provided block-less veriﬁcation and public veriﬁability at
the same time. In this scheme, the veriﬁer can verify the integrity of an outsourced ﬁle by verifying a combination of
pre-computed ﬁle tags. Compact POR by Shacham et al. [8] provided stateless veriﬁcation and a rigorous security
proof. They proposed a construction for private veriﬁcation i.e. data can only be veriﬁed by the owner. There second
construction was BLS-based and provided public veriﬁcation. The main drawback of these schemes was that these
schemes did not allow dynamic data update. These schemes were for archival data stored on cloud.
Dynamic PDP by Erway et al. [11] was the ﬁrst scheme that supported integrity veriﬁcation and full data dynamics
using a rank-based skip list as authenticated data structure for veriﬁcation of updates. But public veriﬁability was not
supported by this scheme. Later, Wang et.al[4] in 2011 proposed a scheme that provided dynamic data update and
public auditability which means that the integrity veriﬁcation of client’s data residing on cloud can be done by a third
party auditor. They used a Merkle Hash Tree[16] for verifying the updates and homomorphic tags for verifying the
integrity of data. Later C. Wang et al. in 2011 [5] improved this scheme to ensure privacy during public auditing. But
in the above two schemes, only insertion, deletion and modiﬁcation of ﬁxed sized blocks is supported. Secondly, no
provision is made to authorize any particular TPA to perform auditing on client’s behalf. Actually, any third party may
act as auditor in above protocols. In 2013, C.Liu et al.[12] proposed a scheme that supported arbitrary sized updates
on variable sized blocks. Also, an authentication mechanism between client and TPA is proposed to prevent endless
challenges by an unauthorized TPA. In 2015, Jin Li et al.[13] proposed a scheme for resource constrained devices in
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which they introduced a cloud audit server who performs all preprocessing of client’s data(which is computationally
very heavy) before uploading on the cloud storage server and later veriﬁes the integrity of data.
8. Conclusion
In this paper, we optimized the public auditing of client’s data residing on cloud by shifting the HLA’s from CSS
site to TPA’s site. We also proposed a protocol for performing dynamic data update using a modiﬁed Chameleon
Authentication Tree (mCAT). Here, we proved the security of our optimized auditing protocol by showing that it is
resistant to replay, replace and forge attacks. We have shown the computation cost(time) for generation of mCAT at
the client’s side and overall computation time taken for block authentication and update of authentication path during
dynamic data update phase. Also, we have shown the overall computation time per auditing task for our auditing
scheme. Finally, we compared our mCAT with Merkle Hash Tree(MHT) in terms of number of hash computations
while authenticating the update operations. This analysis shows that our protocols are eﬃcient and secure.
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